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Present Military Uses of the Seabed
and Foreseeable Developments
JENS EVENSENr
I. MILITARY INTEREST IN THE OCEAN FLOOR
The present and future uses of the ocean floor and its subsoil for
military purposes add new and dangerous dimensions to modern strategy
and foreign politics. Inherent in this new strategic situation is the danger
of an escalation of the arms race to vast new areas of our globe, a de-
velopment which is highly undesirable and dangerous.' For a short period
of time the armament of the ocean floor might entail a brief advantage
to one superpower and thus create a possible disturbance of the balance
of power between the superpowers with an ensuing threat to world peace.
It is foolhardy to believe that there is such a technological gap between
the superpowers or such flaws in their intelligence networks that any
temporary imbalance in the armaments race on the ocean floor would
not be speedily remedied. Thus, the "race" would represent unnecessary
expenditures, channeling the limited funds and resources of the world
away from more worthwhile purposes.
Other dangers and disadvantages are equally obvious. Strategic con-
siderations would create pressures on the world's powers to challenge
the doctrine that the deep ocean floor and its subsoil are not open for
appropriation by individual states. Even without formal appropriation,
it is reasonable to expect that the military uses of a certain area of the
ocean floor would take precedence over the peaceful uses, thus hindering
their economic exploitation. Although the areas to be used exclusively
for military purposes might be of limited size while the free areas of the
*Director General of the Judicial Department of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs; Representative of Norway to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-
bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. The findings of
the author are based on published material only and on conclusions which can reason-
ably be drawn from such material.
1. Burke, Towards a Better Use of the Ocean, in REPORT OF THE SIPRI CONFERENCE
125 (Stockholm, 1968).
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ocean floor would remain vast, it may be expected that the areas to be
taken for military uses might be those which would also offer the easiest
means of economic exploitation. Examples would be mountain ranges
and underwater mountain peaks.
The use of the ocean floor and its subsoil for military purposes might
likewise entail serious dangers for the traditional freedoms of the super-
jacent waters, navigation, and fishing. It has been maintained that one
of the main advantages which the placement of arms or other military
installations on or in the ocean floor offers is the cloak of secrecy with
which such installations might be covered. Possibly this is true for minor
installations which can be constructed without major efforts in terms of
work and equipment on the surface. However, construction of major
military installations might prompt the "owner state" to fence off the
superjacent seas from normal use in order to protect or hide its military
activities in the area.
Problems of frightening proportions would arise if nuclear armaments
should be placed on or in the ocean floor. Aside from the increased
danger of a nuclear holocaust in case of war, the emplacement of such
weapons in the sea would always entail the danger of nuclear pollution
of the oceans. Such concern is not unrealistic because experience has
taught that although the technological achievements of man are seem-
ingly unlimited, they are at the same time subject to accidents and un-
expected human errors.
The importance which the great powers attach to the strategic possi-
bilities of the ocean floor and its subsoil, including the continental
shelves and the seabed of territorial waters, is demonstrated by the in-
creased appropriations of funds for military oceanographic research. Such
research is obviously not exclusively for peaceful purposes, but may con-
tribute enormously to scientific and technological breakthroughs in rela-
tion to these areas of our globe and might thereby contribute greatly to
the peaceful exploration and exploitation of the seas.
The importance which the superpowers attach to the ocean has clearly
been stated in numerous official United States publications. One Presi-
dential panel reported:
It is very possible that the kind of strategic offensive force we may
wish to develop for the future will rely even more heavily on ocean-
based systems than that which we now have. Such systems may very
well require operations at a much wider range of ocean environment
and for much longer times than at present. Thus, the need for ocean-
ographic research and support of these weapon systems becomes even
greater and will certainly have to encompass a wider problem area in
development and maintenance of present submarine forces. These
problems will range from ascertaining that the ocean-based systems
cannot easily be compromised by an enemy's exploitation of some
hitherto hidden effects of the ocean's environment, to development
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of massive ocean engineering capabilities. It is likely that the Navy's
involvement in oceanographic research to develop, support, and main-
tain our weapon systems will increase rather than decrease in the future
and will include a more widespread range of problems than it cur-
rently does.2
The essence of this statement is to suggest the increased use of the
ocean floor and its subsoil for military purposes. As long as operative
international agreements banning arms in these areas have not been con-
cluded, the advisory panels and the military staffs of the world's powers
will more and more vehemently advise their respective governments to
invest in these vast military potentials.
The United States budget shows the tremendously increased interest
which the United States is paying to the military aspects of the ocean
floor. In the early 1960's, the appropriations of the Department of De-
fense for Oceanographic Research Programs were only a few million
dollars. For fiscal year 1966, the appropriations for such research had
increased to some $165 million. In fiscal year 1969, the United States
will spend a total of some $516 million for oceanographic programs.
More than half of these appropriations, $287 million, will be spent by
the Navy.3 We may assume that similar increases take place in the Soviet
Union, which has recently put enormous emphasis on strengthening and
modernizing its navy, especially its submarine fleet.
II. PRESENT MILITARY USES
It is difficult to ascertain fully the extent to which the ocean floor and
its subsoil have already been put to military uses, but it is an indisputable
fact that the ocean floor today is being used to an increasing extent for
military purposes.4 Indeed, this is one of the reasons why the United
States proposed seabed arms controls that are conspicuously limited to
the emplacement of fixed nuclear weapons and launching platforms for
such weapons on or beneath the ocean floor. The United States seemed
disinclined to accept a general prohibition of the use for military purposes
of the seabed and subsoil.
The simplest military use of the ocean floor is the emplacement and
anchoring of deep sea mines. Such mines can be applied for offensive as
2. PRESIDENT'S ScIENcE ADVIsoRY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE PANEL ON OCEANOGRAPHY
33-34 (1966).
3. Hersch, An Arms Race on the Sea Bed, WAR AND PEACE REPORT, Aug.-Sept. 1968
at 8-9.
4. See U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/28, at 1, n. 1 (1968). Unfortunately the writer does not
read Russian. Therefore Russian texts were not used.
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well as defensive purposes. During World War II, numerous refinements
in deep sea mining techniques were developed with little or no considera-
tion given to the existing rules of international law concerning naval
warfare.
The question of the application of deep sea mines in marine warfare
has reached staggering proportions as a result of the possibility of using
nuclear mines in the future. There is no doubt that such mines can
easily be constructed if they are not already a reality. For defensive
purposes, the mines might be of limited size because they probably would
be installed in the waters adjacent to the home country. Nevertheless, the
danger of pollution would be present. Nuclear mines used for offensive
purposes would be much more dangerous weapons. Various theories have
been advanced as to the use of such mines, besides destroying enemy
ships. Located close to enemy shores, the detonation of large nuclear
mines could create enormous flood-waves. The effect would be decisive
if used against densely populated shorelines like the east coast of the
United States.
The strategic advantages of nuclear powered submarines armed with
missiles having atomic warheads and which can remain submerged for
months at a time are many.5 The ocean affords maximum protection
against detection and counter-attack. The submarines are not stationary,
like land-based missile sites, and a surprise attack of the enemy would not
be able to eliminate such submarines to the same extent as land-based
missile sites. The distance to enemy targets is drastically reduced. It is
estimated that an attacking intercontinental missile from shore to shore
would cover the distance from Russia to New York or Chicago via the
Arctic in some 30 to 45 minutes. A nuclear missile launched from a sub-
marine could cut this time in half and greatly increase the surprise ef-
fect. The reduced distance would also heighten the missile's accuracy.
Finally, it could increase the possibility of applying medium-range or
short-range missiles, thereby increasing the missile arsenal considerably.
United States submarines armed with Polaris-type nuclear warheads
and similar Soviet submarines have become "a fundamental building
block for strategic forces." 6 The Polaris-type submarines have the capa-
bility to rest on the ocean floor for extended periods of time, thus be-
coming a prototype for future launching bases on the seabed. However,
underwater military installations have disadvantages, which the sub-
marine force exemplifies. They are relatively expensive to operate com-
pared to land-missile forces and they are presently limited in warhead
size. Consequently, the ocean-based missile force could conceivably take
some totally new direction of development in the future which might
5. TIrmE, March 14, 1969, at 22.
6. See note 2 supra.
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combine many characteristics of the landbased force, such as less ex-
pense, larger payloads, and better command and control, while retaining
invulnerability, the characteristic of the submarine force.
In view of the heavy emphasis which the world powers have given
to nuclear-powered submarines with nuclear arms, it must be considered
that, short of total disarmament, the chances are minimal that such
nuclear weapons (and perhaps other similar types of mobile underwater
launching devices as well) will be outlawed in the foreseeable future.
The appearance of the Polaris-type submarines has resulted in new
types of tracking and detection systems on the ocean floor. For example,
navigational or meteorological aids to submarines and anti-detection
systems have already been built. These various systems and devices were
openly referred to during the debates in the United Nations Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor.7
Views have been voiced to the effect that the deep ocean floor should
either be declared "off limits" to detection and surveillance equipment,
or that such equipment should be operated jointly by the superpowers
or by an international organization.8 Such proposals are hardly realistic,
since they presuppose an atmosphere of conciliation and detente which
does not reflect the present international situation.9
Finally, the ocean floor can be used as a testing ground for nuclear
weapons. Such nuclear tests have been undertaken by the United States,
the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France. The dangers in-
herent in such tests are evident, and have led the nations of the world
to include in Article 1 of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty1° prohibi-
tions to the effect that no "nuclear test explosion or any other nuclear
explosion" may take place "under water including territorial waters or
high seas."" However, it is uncertain whether this prohibition also ap-
plies to underground explosions beneath the ocean floor. Article 1 of the
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should be interpreted in this manner, because
of the wording and the clear intent of the Article.
Although a large number of states are parties to the Test Ban Treaty,
it should be noted that important exceptions exist, such as France and
Communist China, which expressed a certain determination to continue
7. U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/26(1968). See also supra note 1, at 114-16; note 2 supra.
8. See note I supra.
9. MARINE SCIENCE AFFAIRS, THIRD REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS 85
(1969) (includes a recent assessment of various surveillance devices).
10. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, done Aug. 5, 1963, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S.
43 (effective Oct. 10, 1963).
11. For how the Mid-Atlantic Ridge -a mountain range extending from the
Antarctic to the Arctic - divides the Atlantic into two regions and also how mountain
peaks are strategically located in the Atlantic, see The Atlantic Ocean Floor, NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC, June 1968, at 794.
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such tests. The use of the ocean and the ocean floor as testing grounds
for nuclear weapons may still be considered very much a reality.
III. FUTURE MILITARY USES
The deployment of military installations under the oceans will prob-
ably begin in the territorial waters and on the continental shelf adjacent
to the coastlines of the superpowers. Thereafter, other sites such as under-
sea mountain peaks may be utilized.' 2
A recent development in research vehicles with obvious strategic im-
plications was the launchings in December, 1968, of the two small re-
search submersibles Autec I and Autec II. They are being built to operate
at water depths of up to 6500 feet.13 Recent news on underwater research
projects seems to confirm that the United States may have developed a
vehicle which can move on the ocean floor on wheels or tracks. In addi-
tion to their research capabilities such vehicles may be a first step in a
new direction with regard to mobile nuclear weapons platforms. It is
clear that the Soviet Union carries on similar research and has similar
devices at its disposal. The review Hydrospace,14 for example, contains
descriptions of a new Russian research submersible, the AMS 200, a deep
sea self-propelled "laboratory" with accommodations for two observers. It
is able to operate at water depths of up to 450 meters.
With today's technology it is possible to construct fuel and supply
depots for submarines on surface vessels at depths of 600 meters. It is
also possible that the superpowers in the near future will be able to
construct supply depots of a general nature for their nuclear power sub-
marines in distant areas of the main oceans and even create underwater
recreational centers for their submarine crews. Such installations might
take the form of emplacements on the ocean floor, but they might also
be excavated into the ground. Dr. Carl Austin of the United States Naval
Weapons Center, writes:
The building of communities for oceanographic research . . . is now
within our grasp. Someday, and not a too distant day at that, we will
see men and their families living and working beneath the oceans. The
tools and technology exist today.'5
Such installations could increase immensely the operational efficacy of
nuclear submarines and add to the secrecy with which these submarines
could operate.' 6
12. Supra note 2, at 93.
13. Supra note 4, at 5.
14. HYDROSPACE at 43-44 (1968).
15. Austin, Rock Site in a Way into the Sea, SEA FRONTIERS, Nov.-Dec. 1967, at 21-22.
16. Supra note 4, at 6.
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More dangerous are the prospects of having nuclear weapons emplaced
on permanent or semi-permanent launching platforms or sites on or
beneath the ocean floor. Such plans are currently being discussed. For
example, in the 1966 Report by the Panel on Oceanography we read:
Such developments may, for example, take the form of missiles of
Polaris size or even considerably larger placed on relatively shallow
underwater barge systems on the Continental Shelf in a way which
conceals their location and requires the system to move infrequently
so that the potential of its being tracked by motion-generated noise is
minimized. In addition one might consider a slightly mobile ocean-
bottom system which creeps along. Systems of this kind, if they are
ever to be realized, will require different kinds of marine engineering
research from that which produced the current submarine-based force.
Such systems can involve much larger missiles, might require under-
water maintenance by personnel also located underwater, might entail
development of new kinds of implacement gear for positioning missiles,
might necessitate new kinds of detection and survival equipment to
prevent attacks on the implacements, and so on.17
The construction of underwater sites excavated into the ocean floor
in strategically situated underwater mountain peaks is also a distinct pos-
sibility, and has perhaps even reached advanced states of preparation.' s
There might be advantages to such installations. Seabed missile sites
might be less expensive to produce and maintain than missile-carrying
submarines. They could be capable of storing greater numbers of missiles
and missiles with larger payloads. Such underwater installations might
be considerably less vulnerable to nuclear attacks. The shock effects of a
nuclear explosion would be less because of the protection of the ocean
itself. It might also be easier to keep the exact position of an underwater
missile site a secret than similar sites on land. The dangers to the popu-
lation centers near land-based launching sites might be reduced by
moving the missile sites out to sea.19 Underwater missile installations
might move the line of attack and defense much closer to enemy terri-
tory, increasing the surprise of atomic attacks and making an atomic
defense shield installed on the ocean floor close to the shores of the
enemy more effective. From a defensive point of view, the possibility of
intercepting nuclear missiles over the ocean would be preferable to such
interception over heavily populated areas where the nuclear debris from
17. See note 2 supra.
18. See note 15 supra. See also 10 OCEAN SCIENCE NEWs 1, 2 (Jan. 1968). Dr. Robert
Trosch, U.S. Ass't Secr'y of the Navy stated that, "future designs on sea-based deterrents
following Polaris-Posseidon may take many forms. Underwater silos, for example, are
a possibility." Trosch, Military Uses of the Ocean, in SECOND CONFERENCE ON LAW,
ORGANIZATION AND SECURITY IN THE USE OF THE OCEAN 4 (Ohio St. Univ. 1967).
19. Supra note 4, at 4-5 (describing hostile reaction in the Boston area to proposed
nearby ABM sites).
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the destroyed attacking missile might create almost as much havoc as
a direct hit by the nuclear warhead itself.
In general, the use of the ocean floor for missile sites might enlarge
and even totally change the geographical aspects of an atomic war. With
the ocean floor at their disposal the power blocs might - almost without
geographical limitation - surround each other with missile sites for
offensive as well as defensive purposes.
IV. PROPOSALS BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES AS TO
FUTURE MILITARY USES OF THE OCEAN FLOOR AND ITS SUBSOIL
It follows from the above discussion that any extensive armament of
the ocean floor - especially the installation of nuclear arms - must be
avoided. It is naive to assume that an armaments race on the ocean floor
would create additional safety for one or the other of the power blocs -
let alone for the world. On the contrary, the obvious result would be a
frantic escalation of the armaments race leaving none of the world powers
any safer and the world as a whole more exposed to the scourge of war.
The two superpowers seem to have accepted these facts even though they
may have considerable vested military interests in these areas of our
globe.
On November 3, 1969, the Conference of the Committee on Disarma-
ment submitted to the United Nations General Assembly and to the
United Nations Disarmament Commission a Progress Report for the
period March 18, 1969 to October 30, 1969.20 One main item in this report
is the attempt to arrive at a convention concerning prohibitions against
the use of the ocean floor for military purposes. On March 18, 1969, the
Soviet Union presented to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament a
Draft Treaty on Prohibition of the Use for Military Purposes of the Sea-
bed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil thereof.21 On May 22, 1969,
the United States presented to the Geneva Conference its Draft Treaty
Prohibiting the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons
of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and Ocean Floor.22
The Soviet draft treaty contained in Article I, § 1, a strict prohibition
of any military uses of the seabed and the ocean floor and the subsoil
thereof beyond the territorial waters of the coastal state. The width of
the territorial waters was defined as a 12 nautical mile limit. Thus the
draft proposed that all areas of the ocean floor and its subsoil beyond 12
nautical miles from the coast should be neutralized. The prohibition
20. U.N. Doc. A/7741 DC/232 (1969).
21. Id., annex.
22. Id.
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would affect the national continental shelves as well as the deep ocean
floors and their subsoil outside continental shelves.
The prohibitions were directed against "use for military purposes."
Although this terminology is not altogether clear, it was obviously in-
tended to be a broad and comprehensive formula. Taken on its face value
it seems to comprise military bases, constructions, and installations of any
nature including surveillance, tracking, and detection devices. It also
seems to include any type of military manoeuvres and activities on the
ocean floor or its subsoil. Whether it was meant to comprise scientific
research for military purposes or with military equipment is not clear.
Nor is it clear whether the proposal intended to prohibit the temporary
stationing of submarines on the ocean floor. As a whole, the proposal
must be considered somewhat unrealistic in the present circumstances
and was perhaps to some extent formulated for propaganda and bargain-
ing purposes.
The second paragraph of Article I of the Soviet proposal makes it even
more difficult to interpret the real meaning of the first paragraph. The
second paragraph of the Article proposed the prohibition of certain types
of military uses such as the prohibition against the emplacement "on the
ocean bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof" of objects with
nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction and,
further, the construction of "military bases, structures, installations, forti-
fications and other objects of a military nature." All of these activities
would obviously fall under the general prohibitions of Article I, § 1.
Another weakness of Article I of the Soviet proposal is also that a
prerequisite for its acceptance in the harsh realities of foreign politics is
an effective international apparatus of control and inspection. Article II
of the Soviet draft contained certain broad provisions as to verification
and control. These provisions hardly satisfy even the most modest de-
mands for effective control and inspection.
Article IV, paragraph 5 of the Soviet proposal contained provisions to
the effect that a party could unilaterally free itself from its obligations
under the treaty if extraordinary events "jeopardized the supreme inter-
ests of its country." In such a case the draft provided for three months
notice to the United Nations Security Council of the termination of the
treaty.
The American draft treaty of May 22, 1969 contained a considerably
more modest approach to the question of disarmament of the seabed and
ocean floor. The proposal seems to be a follow-up of the United States
draft resolution of 1968 presented to the United Nations Ad Hoc Sea-Bed
and Ocean Floor Committee. This draft resolution urged the conclusion
of a verifiable and effective agreement which would prevent the em-
placement of weapons of mass destruction on the ocean floor.23
23. U.N. Doc. 68 A/7230 at 54 (1968).
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The United States draft treaty was rather restricted in its scope. First,
Article I was limited to the prohibition of planting or placing fixed
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction or associated fixed
launching platforms on, within, or beneath the seabed and ocean floor.
The formulation of Article I, § 1, would leave states with wide possi-
bilities and freedoms as to the use of the ocean floor and the subsoil for
military purposes in the future. It contained no general prohibition
against military uses as such, be it the installation of fortification, struc-
tures or other installations, or the holding of military manoeuvres. It
obviously contained no prohibition against sounding devices, navigational
devices, tracking devices and so on. It would also permit the use of nuclear
armed submarines, including their temporary stay on the ocean floor.
Furthermore, the restrictions in Article I to fixed nuclear weapons and
fixed launching platforms weaken the prohibitions significantly and
make the interpretation of the draft article rather difficult. Actually this
reservation might make the prohibitions almost meaningless if the term
"fixed" is taken in an absolute sense of the word. Would, for example,
a launching platform of the Sea Lab III-type which is constructed in a
way so as to be easily removed be considered a "fixed" installation? Or
what about a structure that would move - although with difficulty - by
its own means on the ocean floor?
The United States proposal contained provisions identical to the Soviet
proposal with regard to unilateral denunciation in cases where the
supreme interests of the country were in jeopardy (see Article IV). The
United States proposal further suggested that the prohibitions should
refer to all areas of the ocean floor and subsoil beyond three nautical
miles from the coast (see Article II).
Negotiations conducted through the summer and fall of 1969 in Geneva
resulted in a joint U.S./U.S.S.R. proposal on the Prohibition of the
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof,
dated October 7, 1969.24 Though rather limited in scope, the draft pro-
posal should be greeted as a significant step forward towards the non-
militarization of the ocean floor.
The preamble to the draft treaty emphasizes that the draft must not be
considered a final result, but only a step towards the exclusion of the
ocean floor and subsoil from an armaments race. The sponsors express
their determination to continue negotiations concerning further measures
leading to this end. The preamble further expresses the conviction that
the draft treaty constitutes a step towards a treaty on "general and com-
plete disarmament under strict and effective international control."
24. Supra note 20, annex.
1970/Military Uses of the Seabed
The prohibitions contained in Article I of the joint treaty are rather
limited in scope. Thus the article deviates considerably from the general
approach of the original Soviet proposal. On the other hand, the joint
proposal must be regarded as a considerable improvement compared to
the original United States draft proposal.
Under Article I, paragraph 1, the participants undertake the obligation
"not to emplant or emplace on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the
subsoil thereof ... any objects with nuclear weapons or any other types of
mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other
facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons."
The reference to "fixed" installations in the original U.S. draft has thus
been deleted in the joint draft of October 7, 1969. This deletion is
obviously a considerable improvement with regard to the scope and appli-
cation of the treaty. But the temporary stay of nuclear armed submarines
on the ocean floor does not seem to be affected by the new wording.
Article III of the joint draft has somewhat more detailed provisions
on the verification and inspection problems than the previous drafts.
Even so, the provisions contained in Article III are hardly satisfactory pro-
visions for an effective international control of the compliance with the
treaty.
Article II together with Article I provides that the draft will apply to
the ocean floor and sub-soils thereof outside a narrow national band of
waters. No express reference is made to the 12 mile limit or the 3
mile limit. But the 12 mile limit of contiguous zones provided for in the
1968 Geneva Convention is used as the main yardstick for the applica-
bility of the treaty.
Article VI of the joint draft maintains the rather hapless possibility of
unilateral denunciation of the Convention in cases where the supreme
interests of a country are jeopardized.
It would be premature and even impossible to draw conclusions from
these preparatory draft treaties as to what military uses of the ocean
floor would be lawful and practicable in the future. The joint U.S./
U.S.S.R. draft was submitted to the 24th General Assembly of the United
Nations for consideration. It was hoped by many that the draft treaty
would obtain a favorable reaction from the General Assembly in 1969,
in view of the considerable advantages of having even a limited treaty
prohibiting an armaments race on the ocean floor adopted at the earliest
possible date.
The results of the deliberations in the United Nations First Committee
in 1969 were that the discussions were postponed until the next General
Assembly, as the joint draft was referred back to the Geneva Conference
and to the United Nations Ocean Floor Committee. Certain delegations
voiced their disappointment with the limited scope of the draft. Others
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feared that the provisions concerning control and supervision were not
sufficiently effective. Although a great number of states greeted the joint
draft as an achievement of great international importance, it cannot be
denied that certain resentment was felt, especially among the developing
countries. The growing practice of the two superpowers to present their
bilateral negotiations as faits accomplis to the rest of the world was looked
upon by these countries with some concern.
